Resilient drug economy and politicised control: the rise and fall of the administrative bureau of prohibited drugs in China, 1922–1925

Yun Huang

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper examines the rise and fall of the Administrative Bureau of Prohibited Drugs in 1920s Shanghai. It identifies the factors associated with the endeavours of the central government to experiment with establishing a Bureau dedicated to regulating refined drugs and the reasons why the Bureau operated for just about two years. It argues that the concerns regarding the widespread of refined drugs and the expected profits of regulating the business pushed the central government to experiment establishing the Bureau. Moreover, this experiment was a tool with which the Beiyang government aimed to centralise its authorities on the issue of drug control. However, the room for manoeuvring the Bureau was limited, mainly because of the resilience of the drug economy and the politicised regulations. Struggling in the narrow space between the colonial powers, the merchant groups, and the local authorities acting under the influence of warlords, the Bureau was doomed to be short-lived. Its history reveals the resilience of both licit and illicit drug economy and the power struggles that resulted from efforts to regulate refined drugs.

Keywords: refined drugs; Administrative Bureau of Prohibited Drugs; drug policy; drug history; modern China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-his
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Published in Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 19, December, 2023, 5(2), pp. 54-68. ISSN: 2516-7227

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