Pre-electoral coalitions and the distribution of political power

Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Jaakko Meriläinen () and Janne Tukiainen

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties’ chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens’ preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties’ chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens’ policy preferences.

Keywords: coalition formation; local elections; multi-party systems; open-list proportional representation; pre-electoral coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2024-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published in Public Choice, 1, January, 2024, 198(1-2), pp. 47 - 67. ISSN: 0048-5829

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Related works:
Journal Article: Pre-electoral coalitions and the distribution of political power (2024)
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