Incentives for quality over time - the case of Facebook applications

Jörg Claussen, Tobias Kretschmer and Philip Mayrhofer

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study the market for applications on Facebook, the dominant platform for social networking and make use of a rule change by Facebook by which high-quality applications were rewarded with further opportunities to engage users. We find that the change led to quality being a more important driver of usage while sheer network size became less important. Further, we find that update frequency helps applications maintain higher usage, while generally usage of Facebook applications declines less rapidly with age.

Keywords: usage intensity; social media; platform management; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L50 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-03-06
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/121769/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives for Quality over Time - The Case of Facebook Applications (2012)
Working Paper: Incentives for Quality over Time – The Case of Facebook Applications (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:121769

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