Revisiting the Eswaran-Kotwal model of tenancy

Maitreesh Ghatak and Dilip Mookherjee

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Persistence of sharecropping tenancy, and increases in farm productivity resulting from regulations protecting tenant rights have been observed in many developing countries. This paper examines if these can be explained by alternative models of sharecropping with two sided efforts/investments, namely, complete contract models, either without wealth constraints (Eswaran-Kotwal, 1985) or with a wealth constrained tenant (Mookherjee, 1997; Banerjee-Gertler-Ghatak, 2002), and incomplete contract holdup models without wealth constraints (Grossman Hart, 1986). In the absence of wealth constraints, the complete contract model always results in (incentive constrained) surplus-maximizing productivity; thus, there can be no scope for tenancy regulations to raise productivity. In the incomplete contract model, tenancy regulations would raise productivity only if the tenant’s investments are more important than the landlord’s investment. But in that case, sharecropping tenancy would not persist in the absence of wealth constraints, as the tenant would have purchased the land right ex ante from the landlord. The model with wealth constraints helps explain both the persistence of tenancy and the productivity/surplus enhancing effects of tenancy regulations.

Keywords: contracts; incentives; productivity; Sharecropping; tenancy regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D23 O12 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2024-05-31
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Published in Studies in Microeconomics, 31, May, 2024, 12(1), pp. 32 - 58. ISSN: 2321-0222

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revisiting the Eswaran-Kotwal Model of Tenancy (2024)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Eswaran-Kotwal Model of Tenancy (2023)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Eswaran-Kotwal Model of Tenancy (2023)
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