Trust and state effectiveness: the political economy of compliance

Timothy Besley and Sacha Dray

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper explores the link between trust in government, policymaking and compliance. It focuses on a specific channel whereby citizens who are convinced of the merits of a policy are more motivated to comply with it. This, in turn, reduces the government's cost of implementing this policy and may also increase the set of feasible interventions. As a result, state effectiveness is greater when citizens trust their government. The paper discusses alternative approaches to modelling the origins of trust, especially the link to the design of political institutions. We then provide empirical evidence consistent with the model's findings that compliance is increasing in government trust using the Integrated Values Survey and voluntary compliance during COVID-19 in the United Kingdom.

JEL-codes: I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2024-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in The Economic Journal, 1, August, 2024, 134(662), pp. 2225 - 2251. ISSN: 0013-0133

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122535/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:122535

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