Deceptive choice architecture and behavioral audits: a principles‐based approach
Stuart Mills
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
Regulators are increasingly concerned about deceptive, online choice architecture, including dark patterns and behavioral sludge. From a behavioral science perspective, fostering a regulatory environment which reduces the economic harm caused by deceptive designs, while safeguarding the benefits of well-meaning behavioral insights, is essential. This article argues for a principles-based approach and proposes behavioral audits as a tool to support this approach.
Keywords: regulation; AI; behavioral audits; choice architecture; principles-based regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 R14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2024-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-nud and nep-reg
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Citations:
Published in Regulation and Governance, 31, October, 2024, 18(4), pp. 1426 - 1441. ISSN: 1748-5983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:122714
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