Reciprocity and willingness to pay taxes: evidence from a survey experiment in Latin America

Daniel Ortega, Lucas Ronconi and Pablo Sanguinetti

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Are citizens more willing to pay taxes when the government’s performance improves? We review the tax morale literature, disentangling its different components, and provide empirical evidence exploiting a novel survey conducted in seventeen Latin American cities and an experimental attempt at measuring reciprocity in tax collection in developing countries. The evidence suggests that governments interested in increasing tax revenues should not focus solely on escalating the coercive power of the state (that is, more audits and fines). Rather, providing better public services to society can be an effective (albeit limited) tool to raise revenues.

Keywords: taxes; evasion; tax morale; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H3 O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2016-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economía, 1, April, 2016, 16(2), pp. 55 - 88. ISSN: 1529-7470

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/123088/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Reciprocity and Willingness to Pay Taxes: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America (2016)
Working Paper: Reciprocity and willingness to pay taxes: evidence from a survey experiment in Latin America (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:123088

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