Systemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties
Luitgard A. M. Veraart and
Iñaki Aldasoro
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We provide a framework for modeling risk and quantifying payment shortfalls in cleared markets with multiple central counterparties (CCPs). Building on the stylized fact that clearing membership is shared among CCPs, we develop a modeling framework that captures the interconnectedness of CCPs and clearing members. We illustrate stress transmission mechanisms using simple examples as well as empirical evidence based on calibrated data. Furthermore, we show how stress mitigation tools such as variation margin gains haircutting by one CCP can have spillover effects on other CCPs. The framework can be used to enhance CCP stress‐testing, which currently relies on the “Cover 2” standard requiring CCPs to be able to withstand the default of their two largest clearing members. We show that who these two clearing members are can be significantly affected if one considers higher‐order effects arising from interconnectedness through shared clearing membership. Looking at the full network of CCPs and shared clearing members is, therefore, important from a financial stability perspective.
Keywords: central counterparties; systemic risk; contagion; stress testing; Cover 2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C62 G18 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2025-01-31
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Published in Mathematical Finance, 31, January, 2025, 35(1), pp. 214 - 262. ISSN: 0960-1627
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/124535/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Systemic risk in markets with multiple central counterparties (2025) 
Working Paper: Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties (2022) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:124535
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().