Optimal contingent delegation

Tan Gan, Ju Hu and Xi Weng

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper investigates a two-agent mechanism design problem without transfers, where the principal must decide one action for each agent. In our framework, agents only care about their own adaptation, and any deterministic dominant incentive compatible decision rule is equivalent to contingent delegation: the delegation set offered to one agent depends on the other's report. By contrast, the principal cares about both adaptation and coordination. We provide sufficient conditions under which contingent interval delegation is optimal and solve the optimal contingent interval delegation under fairly general conditions. Remarkably, the optimal interval delegation is completely determined by combining and modifying the solutions to a class of simple single-agent problems, where the other agent is assumed to report truthfully and choose his most preferred action.

Keywords: adaptation; contingent delegation; coordination; dominant strategy mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 L23 M11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 31, March, 2023, 208. ISSN: 0022-0531

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Journal Article: Optimal contingent delegation (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:125399

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