The targeting of economic sanctions

Simeon Djankov and Meng Su

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We use a comprehensive dataset of economic sanctions over the past 30 years to show that US unilateral sanctions are often off the mark, while United Nations sanctions tend to be well-targeted. Sanctions that target democratic stability and conflict resolution are best correlated with their stated goals.

Keywords: economic sanctions; unilateral vs multilateral; human rights abuse; perceptions of corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 F53 H56 K33 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 4 pages
Date: 2025-03-31
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Published in Economics Letters, 31, March, 2025, 248. ISSN: 0165-1765

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:127240

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