Bail-in's unfulfilled promise

Christos Hadjiemmanuil

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The adoption of bail-in by the EU and other jurisdictions as the core tool of their bank resolution regimes promised to ensure the effective financial restructuring of failed banks with the resources of their own stakeholders, thereby achieving the financial stability objectives of resolution while making taxpayer-funded bailouts a thing of the past. In retrospect, despite its many positive effects, it is questionable whether bail-in has fully lived up to its promise. The operationalisation of the bail-in tool is still ongoing, with several legal and practical issues yet to be fully resolved. Furthermore, the tool’s actual use in resolution actions has so far been sporadic and uneven, undermining its credibility; in any event, significant doubts remain as to the appropriateness of bail-in in situations of system-wide distress.

Keywords: BRRD; bail-in; bailout; bank resolution; FSB; key attributes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 G33 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2025-01-30
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Published in European Business Organization Law Review, 30, January, 2025. ISSN: 1566-7529

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