Campaign contributions and legislative behavior: evidence from U.S. congress

Alberto Parmigiani

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: What is the relationship between campaign contributions and legislative behavior of elected representatives? In this paper, I find that more concentrated donations negatively correlate with three costly legislative endeavors of members of Congress: bill sponsorship, speechmaking on the floor and witness appearances before committees. For bill sponsorship, the negative correlation is stronger for topics related to redistribution, such as health and social welfare bills. To interpret these results, I argue that a more skewed structure of contributions makes members of Congress more dependent on their top donors and thus potentially more inclined to represent their interests. By reciprocating favors to donors, by seeking to secure their continued financial support, or simply by enjoying more leisure time as a result of feeling secure in their financial backing, federal legislators are less active in activities related to the Congressional agenda and public policy. Overall, I contend that campaign contributions distort the incentives of elected representatives to allocate legislative effort in Congress.

Keywords: legislative behavior; agenda; campaign donations; congress; money in politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 I38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2025-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published in Journal of Public Economics, 31, March, 2025, 243. ISSN: 0047-2727

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:127295

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