The myths of blockchain governance

Daniel Ferreira

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Research Question/Issue Blockchain technology promises to revolutionize governance through strong commitments, trustlessness, and transparency. This paper examines how these promises have failed to materialize in practice. Research Findings/Insights Drawing on case evidence from major blockchains, including Bitcoin and Ethereum, I argue that blockchains have evolved into technocracies where developers, foundations, and companies exercise disproportionate control. Rather than being exceptional, blockchain governance suffers from the same coordination problems, collective action failures, and centralization tendencies that plague traditional governance systems. Theoretical/Academic Implications The paper concludes that while blockchains offer valuable experiments in governance design, their alleged advantages over traditional institutions remain largely mythical. Practitioner/Policy Implications Blockchain organizations should acknowledge their reliance on off-chain coordination and informal authority. Investors must understand that blockchain governance depends on trusting technical elites, while regulators should recognize that decentralization claims often mask concentrated power structures requiring traditional oversight.

Keywords: blockchain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2025-10-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pay and nep-reg
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Published in Corporate Governance: an International Review, 28, October, 2025. ISSN: 1467-8683

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