Institutional path dependence in European short-term rental regulation

Alessio Sardo, Allegra Grillo, Angelika Kaczmarek and Arnulfo Daniel Mateos Durán

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This article investigates how legal systems and legal experts across Europe respond to short-term rental accommodation (STRA), focusing on enforcement and authority allocation. It combines a comparative legal analysis of Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain with an experimental expert survey of approximately 180 legal scholars, embedding a strategic–interaction game that varies regulatory and market conditions. Findings reveal institutional lock-in: both legal systems as a whole and legal experts as individuals rely on traditional property/tenancy and competition frames, reinforcing path dependence. Experts also tend to overestimate compliance, even when fines are low and easily absorbed, underestimating the likelihood of strategic non-compliance.

Keywords: short-term rental accommodation; Airbnb; overtourism; European Union competition law; affordable housing; tenancy models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R21 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2026-03-31
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Regional Studies, 31, March, 2026, 60(1). ISSN: 0034-3404

Downloads: (external link)
https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/137828/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:137828

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().