Mandate models and the inelastic market hypothesis
Johannes Ruf and
Yueying Sun
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
The aggregate equity market displays only small price elasticity; in particular, macroeconomic allocations in and out of the equity market lead to surprisingly large impacts on stock valuations. Gabaix and Koijen study this phenomenon and provide a theoretical framework to explain the observed price inelasticity. They consider financial agents who are constrained in their investment strategies and subjected to a mandate that prescribes their investment allocations. Here we develop a rigorous framework of a mandate model for a representative agent and provide precise conditions under which the stock valuation dynamics are well de fined. We also study how mandates amplify or attenuate the response of stock capitalisation to changes in bond capitalisation. We furthermore formulate conditions under which different funds, each one equipped with their own mandate, can be aggregated to a representative fund.
Keywords: equilibrium; flow; fixed point; inelastic market hypothesis; price elasticity; representative fund; response propagation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G12 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08-19
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Published in Mathematical Finance, 19, August, 2026. ISSN: 0960-1627
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