Regulation by reputation? Intermediaries, labor abuses, and international migration

A. Nilesh Fernando and Niharika Singh

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Migrant workers and employers rely on intermediaries to facilitate labor market placements. If information frictions obscure their reputation, however, intermediaries may underinvest in placement quality. Using data on more than 1.5 million Sri Lankan migrants to the Gulf region, we examine the effects of a government-run intermediary rating program that publicly revealed ratings two years after it was announced. Prior to the ratings’ public release, underperforming intermediaries invest in the rating criteria and place migrants in less abusive and more remunerative employment. Our results suggest the government’s threat of quality revelation induced intermediaries to prospectively screen employers and improve placement quality.

Keywords: labor intermediaries; placement quality; international migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 O12 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2026-09-30
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Published in Review of Economics and Statistics, 30, September, 2026, 108(5), pp. 1222 – 1238. ISSN: 0034-6535

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