Communication externalities in cities

Sylvie Charlot and Gilles Duranton

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: To identify communication externalities in French cities, we exploit a unique survey recording workplace communication of individual workers. Our hypothesis is that in larger and/or more educated cities, workers should communicate more. In turn, more communication should have a positive effect on individual wages. By estimating both an earnings and a communication equation, we find evidence of communication externalities. Being in a larger and more educated city makes workers communicate more and in turn this has a positive effects on wages. However, only a small fraction of the overall effects of a more educated and larger city on wages percolates through this channel.

Keywords: human capital; cities; communication externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 R19 R29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2003-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20016/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Communication externalities in cities (2004)
Working Paper: Communication externalities in cities (2004)
Working Paper: Communication Externalities in Cities (2003)
Working Paper: Communication Externalities in Cities (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:20016

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