Opinion pooling on general agendas

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: How can different individuals’ probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for many practical applications. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. Our main theorems characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for large classes of agendas, with standard results as special cases.

Keywords: Opinion pooling; subjective probability; probability theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2008-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20127/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Opinion pooling on general agendas" (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:20127

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