A simple test of the shirking model

Alan Manning and Jonathan Thomas

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Although popular in some circles, efficiency wage models of the labour market have proved surprisingly difficult to test and direct evidence for the central tenets of the theory is rare to non-existent. In this paper we propose a simple test of the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model which is based on the following idea. In the traditional search model the distribution of accepted wages should be truncated below by the reservation wage. But, if shirking is important then the employer will never want to employ a worker at their reservation wage and the distribution of accepted wages should be truncated below by the reservation wage plus something. That something is a measure of the importance of shirking. We test this prediction using data from the UK Survey of Incomes In and Out of Work. The results are not particularly supportive of the shirking model.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 1997-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20300/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Simple Test of the Shirking Model (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:20300

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