Trading arrangements and industrial development
Diego Puga and
Anthony Venables
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
This paper outlines a new approach for analysing the role of trade in promoting industrial development. It offers an explanation as to why firms are reluctant to move to economics with lower labour costs, and shows how trade liberalisation can change the incentives for firms to locate in developing countries. Unilaterally liberalising imports of manufcatures can promote industrialisation, but membership of a preferential trading arrangement is likley to create larger gains. South-South PTAs will be sensitive to the market size of member states, while North-South PTAs seem to offer better prospects- for participating Southern economies, if not for excluded countries.
Keywords: preferential arrangements; industrialisation; development; linkages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1996-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2284/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Trading Arrangements and Industrial Development (1998)
Working Paper: Trading arrangements and industrial development (1997) 
Working Paper: Trading Arrangements and Industrial Development (1996) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:2284
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