Corporate governance and regulation: can there be too much of a good thing?
Valentina Bruno and
Stijn Claessens ()
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder protection, and consequently positively impacts valuation. We find substitution in valuation impact between corporate governance measures at the company and country level, with a possibility of over-regulation. Corporate governance appears also more valuable for companies that rely heavily on external financing, consistent with the hypothesis that corporate governance main role is to protect external financiers.
JEL-codes: G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2006-10-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24633/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing? (2010) 
Working Paper: Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (2007) 
Working Paper: Corporate governance and regulation: can there be too much of a good thing ? (2007) 
Working Paper: Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:24633
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