Credible pensions

Timothy Besley and Andrea Prat

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans.

JEL-codes: G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004-11-26
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24822/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Credible pensions (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:24822

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