Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence

Ralph-C Bayer () and Frank Cowell ()

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic inter- dependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms of either output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms behaviour in two dimensions - their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firm in both dimensions.

Keywords: Tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2006-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2680/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence (2009)
Working Paper: Tax Compliance and Firms' Strategic Interdependence (2006)
Working Paper: Tax Compliance and Firms’ StrategicInterdependence (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:2680

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