Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information
Thibault Gajdos () and
Jean-Christophe Vergnaud
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
The most usual procedure when facing decisions in complex settings consists in consulting experts, aggregating the information they provide, and deciding on the basis of this aggregated information. We argue that such a procedure entails a substantial loss, insofar as it precludes the possibility to take into account simultaneously the decision maker’s attitude towards conflict among experts and her attitude towards imprecision of information. We propose to consider directly how a decision maker behaves when using information coming from several sources. We give an axiomatic foundation for a decision criterion that allows to distinguish on a behavioral basis the decision maker’s attitude towards imprecision and towards conflict.
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27005/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information (2013) 
Working Paper: Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information (2013) 
Working Paper: Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:27005
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