Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games

Bernhard von Stengel

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game, as they arise in sequential play, with the Nash payoff in simultaneous play. If the game is symmetric, has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best reply function, then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff, or even lower than in the simultaneous game. This gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing.

Keywords: Cournot; Duopoly game; Endogenous timing; Follower; Leader; Stackelberg; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; ISI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, July, 2010, 69(2), pp. 512-516. ISSN: 0899-8256

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Journal Article: Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games (2010)
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