Leadership games with convex strategy sets

Bernhard von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir ()

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, including nongeneric games. The main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that, as a set, the leader's payoffs in equilibrium are at least as high as his Nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game. We also consider leadership games with three or more players, where most conclusions no longer hold.

Keywords: Commitment; Correlated equilibrium; First-mover advantage; Follower; Leader; Stackelberg game; ISI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, July, 2010, 69(2), pp. 446-457. ISSN: 0899-8256

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27653/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Leadership games with convex strategy sets (2010)
Working Paper: Leadership Games with Convex Strategy Sets (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:27653

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().