The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

Franz Dietrich

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.

Keywords: ISI; Judgment aggregation; Subjunctive implication; Material implication; Characterisation of possibility agendas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, March, 2010, 145(2), pp. 603-638. ISSN: 1095-7235

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Journal Article: The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications (2010)
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