Bayesian group belief

Franz Dietrich

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of the group members. The group members may have different information, different prior beliefs and even different domains (algebras) within which they hold beliefs, accounting for differences in awareness and conceptualisation. As is shown, group beliefs can incorporate all information spread across individuals without individuals having to explicitly communicate their information (that may be too complex or personal to describe, or not describable in principle in the language). The group beliefs derived here take a simple multiplicative form if people's information is independent (and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily). This form contrasts with familiar linear or geometric opinion pooling and the (Pareto) requirement of respecting unanimous beliefs.

Keywords: utility-theory; aggregation; opinion pooling; Bayesianism; axiomatic approach; subjective probability; ISI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, October, 2010, 35(4), pp. 595-626. ISSN: 0176-1714

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayesian group belief (2010)
Working Paper: Bayesian group belief (2009)
Working Paper: Bayesian group belief (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:29573

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