Directed search with multiple job applications

Manolis Galenianos and Philipp Kircher

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. Our main theoretical contribution is to integrate the portfolio choice problem faced by workers into an equilibrium framework. All equilibria of our model exhibit wage dispersion. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of wages is decreasing and higher wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most models of directed search, the equilibria are not constrained efficient.

Keywords: Directed search; Multiple applications; Portfolio choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (163)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, March, 2009, 144(2), pp. 445-471. ISSN: 1095-7235

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29702/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Directed search with multiple job applications (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications (2005)
Working Paper: Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications (2005)
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