Efficiency of simultaneous search

Philipp Kircher

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity. They observe firms’ wage postings before choosing where to apply. Owing to coordination frictions, a firm may not receive any applications; otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers. It is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient Walrasian outcome as application costs vanish. Even for nonnegligible application costs, the entry of firms, the search intensity, and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient. Wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency.

JEL-codes: J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (83)

Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2009, 117(5), pp. 861-913. ISSN: 0022-3808

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29703/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency of Simultaneous Search (2009)
Working Paper: Efficiency of Simultaneous Search (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:29703

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