Revolving door lobbyists

Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca and Christian Fons-Rosen

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Washington's 'revolving door' - the movement from government service into the lobbying industry - is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.

Keywords: Lobbying; revolving door; US Congress; political connections; political elites (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 J24 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2010-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/31546/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Revolving Door Lobbyists (2012)
Working Paper: Revolving Door Lobbyists (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:31546

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