Politics, labor, regulation, and performance: lessons from the privatization of OTE

George Pagoulatos and Nikolaos Zahariadis

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We use a public interest approach to assess the impact of weak regulation and troubled labor relations on the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE) market and social performance since 1992. Our findings confirm that regulation in tandem with reduced state ownership generally improves market and social performance. Much depends on the intensity of regulation, not just its scope. Labor also plays a critical role in tempering performance in critical junctures of the privatization cycle; in order to secure industrial peace in the short run political authorities undermine the company’s long-term market performance. The study sheds light on the political calculus of labor policy and state-business relations during and after privatization.

JEL-codes: N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2011-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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