Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua

Oriana Bandiera

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible techniques? I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented plots. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution. The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land. Further evidence suggests that, in this context, the inefficiency derives from lack of commitment.

Keywords: Agricultural productivity; asymmetric information; crop choice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 O12 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2002-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3545/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Land Distribution, Incentives and the Choice of Production Techniques in Nicaragua (2002)
Working Paper: Land Distribution, Incentives and the Choice of Production Techniques in Nicaragua (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3545

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().