Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of Public Services

Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-orientated "market" model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralised service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profits. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality.

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (96)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36001/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services (2003)
Working Paper: Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of public services (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:36001

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