Enforcing intellectual property rights

Jean Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978- 1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage “cooperative” interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this adverse effect of high enforcement costs

Keywords: Patents; Court Actions; Settlement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2001-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3730/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (2001)
Working Paper: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (2001)
Working Paper: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3730

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