Just rewards? Local politics and public resource allocation in South India

Timothy Besley, Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine the political economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern of policy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit from improved personal access to public resources. In addition, the head councillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation. While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, voters appear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to public resources.

Keywords: decentralization; India; Panchayat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H76 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2007-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3763/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (2012)
Working Paper: Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3763

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