Political competition and economic performance: theory and evidence from the United States

Timothy Besley, Torsten Persson () and Daniel Sturm

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model’s implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2005-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3770/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2006)
Working Paper: Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2005)
Working Paper: Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:3770

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