Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation

Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We analyze a dynamic model of agenda formation in which players compete in each period to put their ideal policies on the agenda. In each period, with some probability, a decision maker is called upon to take an action from the agenda. We show that in any Markov equilibrium of this game, players with extreme ideal policies will always compete to be in the agenda. On the other hand, there is a positive probability that in each round a more moderate policy will arise on the agenda. Therefore, agenda formation is a gradual process which evolves to include better policies for the decision maker but at a relatively slow pace.

JEL-codes: C68 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-09
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/42012/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Gradualism in Dynamic Agenda Formation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:42012

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