A note on measuring voters’ responsibility

Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We consider a singular event of the following form: in a simple voting game, a particular division of the voters resulted in a positive outcome. We propose a plausible measure that quantifies the causal contribution of any given voter to the outcome. This measure is based on a conceptual analysis due to Braham [1], but differs from his solution to the problem of measuring causality of singular events.

Keywords: Coleman’s measure of power to prevent action; degrees of causation; extent of individual responsibility for collective decision; necessary element of a su�cient set (NESS); simple voting game (SVG) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Homo Oeconomicus, 2009, 26(2), pp. 259-271. ISSN: 0943-0180

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:4296

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