When risk-based regulation aims low: a strategic framework

Julia Black and Robert Baldwin

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This article develops a strategic framework for regulators to employ when choosing intervention strategies for dealing with low risks and reviewing performance, building on the analysis by the same authors in the previous edition of this journal. The framework occupies the operational “middle ground” between risk analysis and formal enforcement action. At its core is a matrix, the Good Regulatory Intervention Design (GRID), which provides a framework to categorize sites or activities on the basis of two factors: the nature of the risk and the nature of the regulatee. Using GRID, regulators can select which intervention tools to use, and determine the overall level of regulatory intensity that should apply. GRID is accompanied by the Good Regulatory Assessment Framework (GRAF) for agencies to use in reviewing their performance and provides a step-by-step process for enabling “double loop learning.” The article also argues that the process of developing such a framework highlighted the extent to which “low risk” and “high risk” regulation are distinct. “Low risk” means “low priority.” Justifying why certain risks should not receive much regulatory attention requires a particular type of engagement, and has a bearing on the regulatory strategies that are adopted

Keywords: low risks; regulation; strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Regulation and Governance, June, 2012, 6(2), pp. 131-148. ISSN: 1748-5983

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Journal Article: When risk‐based regulation aims low: A strategic framework (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:44427

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