You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment

Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni and Giacomo Sillari

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff- dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.

Keywords: coordination games; experimental philosophy; epistemic attitudes; weak-link game; conventions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Synthese, May, 2013, 190(8), pp. 1351-1381. ISSN: 0039-7857

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Related works:
Working Paper: You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment (2012)
Working Paper: You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment (2012)
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