A theory of strategic intermediation and endogenous liquidity

Rohit Rahi () and Jean-Pierre Zigrand

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Market liquidity is typically characterized by a number of ad hoc metrics, such as depth (or market impact), volume, intermediation costs (such as breadth) etc. No general coherent denition seems to exist, and few attempts have been made to justify the existing metrics on welfare grounds. In this paper we propose a welfare-based denition of liquidity and characterize its relationship with the usual proxies. The model on which the welfare analysis rests is an equilibrium model with multiple assets and restricted investor participation. Strategic intermediaries pursue prot opportunities by providing intermedia- tion services (i.e. \liquidity") in exchange for an endogenous fee. Our model is well suited to study the contagion-like eects of liquidity shocks. We also consider the case in which intermediaries can optimally design securities.

Keywords: Liquidity; intermediation; arbitrage; restricted participation; con- tagion; market microstructure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D53 G10 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2007-12-17
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4764/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:4764

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().