Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games

Georg Weizsäcker

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Two behavioral models of two-person normal-form game play are presented and estimated, using three experimental data sets. The models are variants of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model defined by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Games and Economic Behavior), but allow a player to hold inaccurate beliefs about the behavior of her opponent. Each model involves two parameters: One captures the player’s own level of response rationality, the other the level she attributes to her opponent. In order to allow for type heterogeneity among the subjects in the experiments, parametric distributions of these parameters are assumed. The estimation results indicate that the subjects’ choices follow a specific anomalous pattern: On average, subjects play as if they significantly underestimated their opponent’s rationality.

Keywords: Beliefs; prediction accuracy; experiments. JEL classification codes : C23; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, July, 2003, 44(1), pp. 145 -171. ISSN: 0899-8256

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Journal Article: Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games (2003)
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