The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: fiscal restrictions and regional stability
Evi Pappa
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect regional inflation and output in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government expenditure and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under constant taxes and constant regional inflations. With cooperation debt and deficit constraints reduce regional inflation variability, but the path of output is suboptimal. Under non-cooperation the opposite occurs due to a trade-off between taxation and inflation variability. Decentralized rules, rather than constraints, stabilize regional inflation and output. They imply more fiscal action for smaller union members.
Keywords: Inflation differentials; monetary union; budgetary restrictions; fiscal rules. JEL classification codes : E63; F41; F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 F41 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/510/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability (2007) 
Working Paper: The Unbearable Tightness of Being in a Monetary Union: Fiscal Restrictions and Regional Stability" (2005) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:510
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