Robin Hood’s compromise: the economics of moderate land reforms

Oriana Bandiera and Gilat Levy

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: This paper analyses the consequences of an unusual type of land redistribution; we take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that such “moderate” reform reduces agency costs and thereby increases productivity, total surplus in the economy, and the welfare of rural workers. Compared to the classic redistribution ”to the tiller”, moderate reforms do worse in terms of equity and do not give the poor a collaterizable asset. They can however do equally well in terms of efficiency and might be more sustainable both financially and politically.

Keywords: land reform; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Published in Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 2004, 3(1), pp. Article 19. ISSN: 1538-0645

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Journal Article: Robin Hood's Compromise: The Economics of Moderate Land Reforms (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:542

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