Calvin's reformation in Geneva: self and social signalling
Gilat Levy and
Ronny Razin
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
As Weber (1904) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals’ behaviour, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination.
JEL-codes: Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Calvin's Reformation in Geneva: Self and Social Signalling (2014)
Working Paper: Calvin's reformation in Geneva: self and social signalling (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:54256
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