 Shareholder empowerment and bank bailoutsDaniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier () and Edmund-Philipp Schuster LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library Abstract: We propose a management insulation index based on banks’ charter and by-law provisions and on the provisions of the applicable state corporate law that make it difficult for shareholders to oust a bank’s management. We show that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 were roughly 18 to 26 percentage points less likely to be bailed out in 2008/09. We also find that banks in which the management insulation index was reduced between 2003 and 2006 were more likely to be bailed out. We discuss alternative interpretations of the evidence. The evidence is mostly consistent with the hypothesis that banks in which shareholders were more empowered performed poorly during the crisis. Keywords: corporate governance; banks bailouts (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:56083 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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