Political challenges of the macroprudential agenda

Jeffrey Chwieroth and Jon Danielsson

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: Central banks frequently lead the macroprudential policy implementation. The hope is that their credibility in conquering inflation might rub off on macroprudential policy. This column argues the opposite. The fuzziness of the macroprudential agenda and the interplay of political pressures may undermine monetary policy.

Keywords: Financial markets; Politics and economics; Central Banks; credibility; macroprudential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 G3 N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-06
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in VoxEU, 6, September, 2013

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