Positively gamma discounting: combining the opinions of experts on the social discount rate
Mark C. Freeman and
Ben Groom
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
The aggregated term structure of social discount rates that results from Weitz-man's (2001) survey of expert opinion is shown to be highly sensitive to the nature of the responses. If variation re.ects irreducible differences in ethical judgements, the term structure can decline rapidly. If variation occurred because respondents were forecasting future rates under uncertainty, the term structure is much flatter because additional experts provide new information. The former approach triples the social cost of carbon when compared to the latter. The distinction between heterogeneity and uncertainty illustrates the need for a nuanced treatment of survey data in intergenerational policy making.
JEL-codes: N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2015-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)
Published in The Economic Journal, 1, June, 2015, 125(585), pp. 1015 - 1024. ISSN: 0013-0133
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57158/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Positively Gamma Discounting: Combining the Opinions of Experts on the Social Discount Rate (2015) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:57158
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by LSERO Manager ().