Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work

Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: CEOs affect the performance of the firms they manage, and family CEOs seem to weaken it. Yet little is known about what top executives actually do, and whether it differs by firm ownership. We study CEOs in the Indian manufacturing sector, where family ownership is widespread and the productivity dispersion across firms is substantial. Time use analysis of 356 CEOs of listed firms yields three sets of findings. First, there is substantial variation in the number of hours CEOs devote to work activities, and longer working hours are associated with higher firm productivity, growth, profitability and CEO pay. Second, family CEOs record 8% fewer working hours relative to professional CEOs. The difference in hours worked is more pronounced in low competition environments and does not seem to be explained by measurement error. Third, difference in diffrences estimates with respect to the cost of effort, due to weather shocks and popular sport events, reveal that the observed difference between family and professional CEOs is consistent with heterogeneous preferences for work versus leisure. Evidence from six other countries reveals similar findings in economies at different stages of development.

JEL-codes: J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2013-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-eff, nep-hrm and nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/58162/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2018)
Working Paper: Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work (2018)
Working Paper: Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work (2017)
Working Paper: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2017)
Working Paper: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2015)
Working Paper: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2013)
Working Paper: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2013)
Working Paper: Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work (2013)
Working Paper: Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work (2013)
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